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Playing the Flashbulb Memory Game: A Comment on Cubelli and Della Sala 
When Brown and Kulik (1977) coined the term Flashbulb memory (FBM) they 
probably did not envisage the lively debate that would follow. They defined FBMs as 
vivid, detailed, and long-lasting memories for the personal circumstances under which 
the individual first learned of a surprising and consequential event. Subsequent studies 
have shown that surprise is not a necessary precondition for FBM formation, since 
FBMs have also been observed for predictable albeit emotional events (Ruiz-Vargas, 
1993; Weaver, 1993). 
Despite the adoption of a photographic metaphor, in Brown and Kulik’s words, 
“a flashbulb memory is only somewhat indiscriminate and is very far from complete” 
(p. 75). The same authors reported gaps and inaccuracies in their own memories for the 
assassination of John F. Kennedy. In fact, the focus of their study was on the 
phenomenological characteristics of FBMs and emotional factors associated with their 
formation and maintenance, not on the assessment of FBM accuracy. Yet, in subsequent 
studies their words have frequently been misinterpreted, and different researchers have 
been confronted with the topic, striving to confirm or disconfirm the original 
photographical metaphor.  
The first and most influential criticism of the FBM hypothesis came from 
Neisser (1982; Neisser and Harsch, 1992) who showed striking inaccuracies in FBM 
recollections, that questioned  the role of special encoding factors. If FBMs are subject 
to distortions and forgetting, then they cannot be considered as special memories, and 
they share the same fate of ordinary autobiographical formations. Following this, across 
the years, showing inaccuracies in FBM recollections has become a powerful 
demonstration that FBMs do not exist – what we term here the flashbulb memory game. 
There are at least two objections against this point: The first is that FBM accuracy is 
extremely difficult if not impossible to prove; the second is that errors and 
reconstructions do not exclude that FBMs are formed and maintained, as Brown and 
Kulik (1977) were at pains to point out.  
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Private contexts for learning of public events 
With respect to the first issue, an objective assessment of the private reception 
context of important (public) events is at least questionable. In FBM studies, researchers 
have adopted proxy indices of FBM accuracy, and this is because of the difficulty in 
assessing the individuals’ original experience: Quantity of recalled details, individuals’ 
confidence in their own recollections, and memory consistency over time (Bohannon 
and Symons, 1992; Curci and Luminet, 2006; Talarico and Rubin, 2003; Neisser and 
Harsch, 1992). Berntsen and Thomsen (2005) developed a documentary method to 
assess factual information about participants’ involvement in the liberation of Denmark 
in World War II, and applied it to evaluate the accuracy of individuals’ memory for the 
weather using archival data from various meteorological stations throughout the 
country. However, this attempt was constrained to details for which objective records 
are available. More recently, Cubelli and Della Sala (2008) maintained that FBM 
studies have usually employed leading questions inducing inferential errors in 
participants’ recollections, and proposed to measure FBMs by comparing individuals’ 
recollections with so called “objective facts”. The authors ran qualitative analyses on 
free accounts collected in a booklet issued in 2004 in response to the question: “Where 
you were on August 2nd, 1980?”. This booklet was a commemoration of the victims of a 
bomb attack to the train station in Bologna, in which 85 people died and over 200 were 
seriously injured. The editors of the booklet put together free accounts of people willing 
to provide a testimony of their own experience of the explosion, and a sample of these 
accounts constituted the material on which Cubelli and Della Sala based their study. 
The ensuing conclusion was that FBMs do not exist since respondents’ recollections 
were far from being accurate and consistent. Indeed, the evaluation of memory accuracy 
proposed by the authors was an assessment of plausibility of recollections, and does not 
rule out the possibility that individuals had fabricated plausible but untrue reports. 
Furthermore, a mix of details of both the event and reception context was reported in the 
examples of free narratives analyzed in that study. To illustrate, the authors discussed 
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the implausibility of a participant’s memory for the “smoke coming from the coffee 
shop”, but it is hard to say if this detail referred to the original event or the reception 
context for that event. In other words, the authors had no way to establish the accuracy 
of the analyzed recollections. Despite claiming an objective method overcoming the 
limits of previous FBM research work: in fact, their criticisms are much more 
applicable to their own investigation. 
 
The role of social determinants in modelling FBMs 
With respect to the reconstructive processes affecting FBM formation, again a 
careful consideration of the original paper by Brown and Kulik (1977) provides useful 
clarification. In that paper, the authors proposed a suggestive but merely speculative 
dichotomy between the iconic format of FBMs and the corresponding narrative 
accounts: While the memory trace was assumed to persist indelible “as the slumbering 
Rhinegold” (p. 86), a variety of narrative accounts could be generated from that trace, 
influenced by covert and overt rehearsal processes. This ontological distinction seems to 
suggest that inaccuracies might ensue from the narrative elaboration of the original 
memory content, while the trace persist immune to distortion and forgetting. This view 
has been challenged by decades of studies on autobiographical memory, which have 
purported to show that modifications and distortions are the regular fate of human 
memories. To illustrate, autobiographical memories, even if referring to highly relevant 
experiences, have been demonstrated to differ across the life-span for the same 
individual. A teenager’s memory of the first day at school, highly concerned with the 
goal of being a good pupil, is fairly different from the memory retrieved by the same 
individual when 40 years old and other goals have become relevant (Conway and 
Rubin, 1993). Individuals appear to reconstruct their past in different forms, with 
respect to the goals they are pursuing in the present, and the process of retrieval 
develops in conformity with the organization of the working self (Carver and Scheier, 
1990; Higgins, 1987). FBMs do not escape from this process. These extraordinarily 
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vivid memory formations would correspond to a mix of sensory-perceptual and 
thematic information from the different levels of knowledge involved in 
autobiographical construction (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). It follows that the 
“live” quality of FBMs does not rule out the possibility that these memories incorporate 
elements coming from subsequent elaborations of the original learning experience.  
The so-called “emotional-integrative model” of formation of FBMs is  consistent 
with the above outlined approach to autobiographical memory (Finkenauer et al., 1998). 
This model has been validated by different empirical investigations using large-sample 
cross-sectional and longitudinal as well as experimental designs applied to FBMs for 
both expected and unexpected events (Curci and Luminet, 2009; Lanciano et al., 2010; 
Luminet and Curci, 2009), showing that the impact of the encoding factors, i.e. emotion, 
consequentiality, surprise, needs to be integrated with the rehearsal elaboration of the 
stimulus event, in order to produce a real FBM. More specifically, the model included 
among the rehearsal factors the individual’s rumination, social sharing, and elaborations 
induced by the exposure to the mass media as well as social availability of prior 
knowledge, attitudes, and expectations concerning the protagonists of the original news. 
The way through which social processes contribute to shape the individual’s FBMs is at 
least twofold. First, people talk and think of an event in different ways, in accordance 
with shared practices within the group to which they belong. Second, the way in which 
the event is shared and ruminated will depend on the availability of mass media 
information from TV broadcastings, radio channels, and newspapers. Again, these 
reflect the group’s habits and shared practices in long-lasting elaborations of the original 
information (Curci, et al., 2001). The emotional-integrative model provides a reliable 
account of the process of formation and maintenance of FBMs, in which the FB-like 
features of these special memories coexist with inaccuracies and distortions typical of 
autobiographical memory formations.  
In addition to these findings concerning the structural patterns of prediction for 
the phenomenon, recent studies have proposed sophisticated psychometric approaches 
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which try to model the special characteristics of FBMs. These formations are thus 
considered not simply as ordinary memories with unusual features of vividness and 
confidence, but they are modelled as “whole” units or “local minima” in the space of 
autobiographical memory (Conway, 1995). The measurement model that best accounts 
for this conceptualization is a categorical model differing from traditional dimensional 
approaches in that the latent construct underlying a set of observed indicators, i.e the 
canonical categories of Brown and Kulik, (1977), is categorical in nature (see Curci & 
Lanciano, 2009; Lanciano  &  Curci, 2012). It follows that, at least from the 
psychometric standpoint, the formation of FBMs is profoundly different from the 
formation of ordinary autobiographical memories. 
Searching for FBMs 
 The main requirement of FBM empirical investigation is to sample memory for 
those public events which have the potential to elicit a strong emotional reaction in the 
audience, thus being remembered for a long time. Paralleling the neuro-physiological 
theory by Livingston (1967), Brown and Kulik (1977) speculated about the biological 
significance of some public news, triggering a special encoding mechanism called Now 
Print! This conceptualization was reflected in the twofold operationalization of the 
importance/consequentiality quality attributed to the original stimulus event, through 
self-report assessments, and participants’ group membership (i. e., American Blacks vs. 
Whites). Er (2003) proposed an importance-driven model of formation of FBMs, which 
represented an empirical test of the original conceptualization adopted by Brown and 
Kulik (1977). Many other studies have taken into account the different involvement that 
different individuals or social groups have towards a given event and its protagonists 
(Conway, et al., 2004; Kvavilashvili, et al., 2003; Smith, et al., 2003). In sum, to be sure 
that we are really assessing  FBM, individuals whose memory is being tested need to be 
seriously engaged by the original news event emotionaly, personally, and culturally. 
 Indeed, there are studies whose authors were claime test the FBM hypothesis, 
but which confuse the importance/consequentiality attribute of the news event with 
FLASHBULB MEMORY HYPOTHESIS 8 
pervasive media coverage. In a study published in 2000 about the memory for the O. J. 
Simpson trial verdict, the authors argue that source distortions indicate an ordinary 
memory encoding process instead of the operation of a special encoding mechanism 
(Schmolck, et al., 2000). However, before drawing conclusions on the nature and 
characteristics of the phenomenon, the authors had to be confident that they really were 
investigating a FBM. Why should a group of white Southern Californian undergraduate 
students ever have had an FBM for that event? When the role of personal 
consequentiality is limited, it is still possible that a stimulus event had a high 
significance for the social group to which the individual belongs. To illustrate, the death 
of an important politician or of a popular person would represent a significant concern 
for a given community (Curci, et al., 2001). In these cases, the effect of social more than 
personal consequentiality is crucial in ascertaining the formation of a FBM. In the study 
of Schmolck et al. (2000) this does not even seem to be the case. 
 To conclude, there is a special category of autobiographical memories which 
persist over time in a vivid and detailed form, and are associated with a strong feeling of 
confidence. These memories are formed and maintained following the private 
experience of upsetting and consequential public or personal events. However, 
reconstructions and distortions intervene also for these special memories. Ultimately 
FBMs share the same destiny of ordinary autobiographical memory formations. In fact, 
in the last decades, different researchers have played a game consisting in presenting 
evidence either in favour or against the FBM hypothesis. In some cases, studies have 
focused on memories that can hardily be defined as likely to elicit or cause FBM 
formation  (Schmolck, et al., 2000). In other cases, studies have employed non-standard 
procedures open to alternative interpretations  (Cubelli & Della Sala , 2012)  that 
overlook the principles of internal and construct validity, as well as disregard years of 
research work on FBMs. The “flashbulb memory game” is one in which the flashbulb 
memory hypothesis is completely wrong or completely right. Whereas is in reality 
FBMs are very unusual memories – what items of public news do you recall your 
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personal circumstances for when learning of them, given the thousands of items of news 
you have been exposed to? We suggest, very few. Understanding why these memories 
intersect with our autobiographical memories in the way they do is, or should be, the 
goal of flashbulb memory research. 
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